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Practical Considerations in Original
Action Litigation: Virginia V.
Maryland and New Jersey v. Delaware
Stuart A. Raphael*
Introduction
In a handful of American rivers that separate one state from another, the
boundary line runs along one state’s shoreline, rather than down the middle
of the river or through the navigable channel. Because sovereignty ordinarily
goes with boundary, a state claiming ownership of the river to the other state’s
shoreline may assert the right to regulate the other’s use of the river beyond the
boundary line, or even to block it entirely. The United States Supreme Court has
decided two such interstate controversies since 2003: Virginia v. Maryland,1 and
New Jersey v. Delaware.2
These cases reached opposite results on similar facts. They provide useful case
studies to highlight three aspects of litigation practice in original action cases.
First, states must give careful pre-litigation consideration to how the posture of
the dispute affects the likelihood that the Court will accept jurisdiction. Second,
even though the Court is not required to give any deference to the special master
it appoints to make recommendations, as a practical matter, success before the
special master may be critical to winning. And third, the fact-specific nature of
* Mr. Raphael is a partner in the McLean, Virginia, and Washington, D.C., offices of
Hunton & Williams LLP. He represented Virginia in Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56 (2003).
He represented BP America, Inc. as amicus curiae in New Jersey v. Delaware, 552 U.S. 597 (2008).
The views expressed here do not necessarily represent the views of any of the parties. This paper was
originally presented at the ABA Environment, Energy, and Resources Law Summit in Indianapolis,
Indiana, in October 2011.
1

540 U.S. 56 (2003).

2

552 U.S. 597 (2008).
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original actions gives the Court flexibility to distinguish precedent that might
otherwise appear controlling. All three of these considerations invite and reward
effective lawyering.

Background
The boundary line in the Potomac River that separates Maryland from
Virginia runs along the Virginia shoreline at the low-water mark.3 Similarly, the
boundary line in the Delaware River that separates New Jersey from Delaware,
within the so-called “Twelve-Mile Circle” from New Castle, runs along the New
Jersey shoreline at the mean low-water mark.4
In both instances, the boundary line had been disputed for centuries and,
before it was resolved, the states signed a compact governing their respective access
rights. Virginia and Maryland entered into the Compact of 1785 but did not
settle the boundary line until binding arbitration decided it in the Black-Jenkins
Award of 1877.5 New Jersey and Delaware entered into the Compact of 1905,
and the Supreme Court settled the boundary line in 1934.6 Article VII of both
compacts addressed access-rights at a time when the signatories were uncertain
where the boundary line would ultimately be drawn. A side-by-side comparison
of the two compact provisions is useful:
Virginia-Maryland Compact
of 1785

New Jersey-Delaware Compact
of 1905

VII. The citizens of each state
respectively shall have full
property in the shores of [the
Potomac] river adjoining their
lands, with all emoluments and
advantages thereunto belonging,
and the privilege of making and
carrying out wharfs and other
improvements, so as not to
obstruct or injure the navigation
of the river.7

VII. Each State may, on its own
side of the river, continue to
exercise riparian jurisdiction of
every kind and nature, and to make
grants, leases, and conveyances of
riparian lands and rights under
the laws of the respective States.8

3

Virginia, 540 U.S. at 62.

New Jersey, 552 U.S. at 602.The boundary line in the lower Delaware River and Bay is in
the middle of the main shipping channel. See New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 385 (1934).
4

5

Virginia, 540 U.S. at 62.

6

New Jersey, 291 U.S. at 385.

7

Virginia, 540 U.S. at 62.

8

New Jersey, 552 U.S. at 602.
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On its face, the language in the 1905 Compact more clearly granted each
state sovereign jurisdiction over activities along its own shoreline than the earlier
compact. New Jersey and Delaware recognized that each state would “continue
to exercise riparian jurisdiction of every kind and nature,” and that each had
the power to grant riparian lands. The 1785 Compact, by contrast, addressed
the rights of citizens along the Potomac River without even mentioning what
jurisdiction Virginia and Maryland could exercise.
Nonetheless, the Court ruled seven to two in Virginia that the 1785 Compact
gave Virginia the power to withdraw water from the River and to extend
improvements beyond the boundary line, “free of regulation by Maryland.”9
This freed Virginia’s Fairfax County Water Authority to construct a water intake
extending 725 feet beyond the boundary line into the channel of the Potomac River
in Maryland. The pipeline was ten feet in diameter and capable of withdrawing
up to 300 million gallons a day. The Court explained that the Compact gave
both states equal rights of access and that those rights were not lost by the fact
that the boundary was later established on Virginia’s side of the river; Article VII
“simply guaranteed that the citizens of each State would retain the right to build
wharves and improvements regardless of which State ultimately was determined to
be sovereign over the River.”10
By contrast, although the 1905 Compact appeared to give New Jersey and
Delaware clearer rights of jurisdiction over their own shores, the Court ruled six
to two in New Jersey that Delaware had powers to regulate New Jersey’s side of
the River that Maryland did not have on Virginia’s side. New Jersey could grant
and regulate “ordinary and usual riparian rights” on its own side of the River,
but Delaware could regulate—and prohibit—any improvements on the New
Jersey side “to the extent that they exceed ordinary and usual riparian uses.”11
This allowed Delaware to block the construction of a liquefied natural gas (LNG)
plant that would have been constructed in Logan Township, New Jersey, but
which depended on a 2000 foot pier extending into the channel of the mile-wide
Delaware River.12
In both cases, the Supreme Court appointed the same special master, Ralph
I. Lancaster, Jr., of Maine.13 Lancaster’s report favored Virginia and the Supreme
Court confirmed his recommendations in full.14 He reached the opposite

9

540 U.S. at 79.

10

Id. at 69 (emphasis added).

11

552 U.S. at 624.

12

Id.

13

New Jersey v. Delaware, 546 U.S. 1147 (2006); Virginia v. Maryland, 531 U.S. 922 (2000).

14

Virginia, 540 U.S. at 79.
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conclusion in New Jersey and would have given Delaware “overlapping” authority
with New Jersey to regulate the construction of riparian improvements on New
Jersey’s side of the River.15 As just noted, the Supreme Court confirmed his
recommendation to the extent it permitted Delaware to regulate uses that “exceed
ordinary and usual riparian uses,” but denied Delaware the authority to regulate
“ordinary and usual riparian uses.”16 This distinction was not mentioned in the
Special Master’s report, the parties’ briefs, or at oral argument.

Pre-Litigation Maneuvering
in View of the Gatekeeping Requirements
The United States Constitution gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction
over suits between states,17 and Congress has made that jurisdiction “exclusive.”18
But the fact that the Supreme Court alone may exercise original jurisdiction
does not mean that it must. The exercise of original jurisdiction is “obligatory
only in appropriate cases.”19 The Court has said that original actions “tax the
limited resources of this Court by requiring us ‘awkwardly to play the role of
factfinder’ and diverting our attention from our ‘primary responsibility as an
appellate tribunal.’”20 So the Court exercises its original jurisdiction “sparingly”
and “retain[s] ‘substantial discretion’ to decide whether a particular claim requires
‘an original forum in this Court.’”21
A state seeking to invoke the Court’s original jurisdiction, in addition to
satisfying Article III’s justiciability requirements, must satisfy two “gatekeeping”
requirements.22 First, the state’s interest must be of such “seriousness and dignity”
to warrant the Court’s intervention.23 Jurisdiction is reserved for “weighty
controversies,”24 with the “model case” being a dispute “of such seriousness
that it would amount to casus belli if the States were fully sovereign.”25 Former
Maine Chief Justice McKusick, a special master in three original actions,26 wrote
15

New Jersey, 552 U.S. at 608.

16

Id. at 624.

17

U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.

18

28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2011).

Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 76 (1992) (quoting Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,
406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972)).
19

South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854, 863 (2010) (quoting Ohio v. Wyandotte
Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 498 (1971)).
20

21

Id. (quoting Mississippi, 506 U.S. at 76).

22

Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U.S. 1, 8 (1995).

23

Mississippi, 506 U.S. at 77 (quoting Illinois, 406 U.S. at 93).

24

South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 869 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

25

Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 571 n.18 (1983).

Kansas v. Nebraska, 528 U.S. 1001 (1999); Louisiana v. Mississippi, 516 U.S. 22 (1995);
Connecticut v. New Hampshire, 503 U.S. 1002 (1992).
26
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a highly regarded law review article in 1993 in which he identified California v.
West Virginia 27—a breach of contract dispute over college football—as a case that
was declined because it “was probably thought too insubstantial to be worthy of
attention by the highest federal tribunal.”28
Second, the state must show there is no “alternative forum in which the issue
tendered can be resolved.”29 The alternative forum may be adequate even though
the complaining state is not a party. In Arizona v. New Mexico,30 for instance, the
Court declined to exercise its original jurisdiction in a suit by Arizona challenging
a New Mexico tax as a violation of the Commerce Clause. The Court found an
adequate alternative forum in a pending suit in which the same issues were being
raised, not by Arizona, but by one of Arizona’s political subdivisions.31 “Arizona’s
interests were thus actually being represented by one of the named parties to
the suit.”32 The “issue of appropriateness,” however, “must be determined on a
case-by-case basis.”33
The Supreme Court typically does not issue an opinion explaining why it
chooses to exercise its original jurisdiction, and it did not do so when it granted
leave to file in Virginia or New Jersey. The seriousness-and-dignity factor was
probably satisfied with ease in both cases. In Virginia, Maryland was blocking a
Virginia municipality from constructing an offshore drinking water intake that
would supply cleaner water to more than a million people in Northern Virginia
and greatly improve operational efficiencies.34 Moreover, the political controversy
27

454 U.S. 1027 (1981).

Vincent L. McKusick, Discretionary Gatekeeping: The Supreme Court’s Management of Its
Original Jurisprudence Docket Since 1961, 45 Me. L. Rev. 185, 198 (1993). The lack of seriousness
was probably a factor in the Court’s decision declining jurisdiction last year in Mississippi v. City of
Memphis. 130 S. Ct. 1317 (2010). Mississippi claimed that groundwater pumping in Memphis was
depleting the Memphis Sands aquifer that underlay various states, including Mississippi. Mississippi
asserted exclusive ownership of the groundwater underneath its soil and sought money damages
for the value of water extracted. Mississippi asked, alternatively, for an equitable apportionment.
Tennessee responded that Mississippi’s groundwater-ownership theory was invalid and that, in any
case, Mississippi could not demonstrate any actual injury from groundwater pumping. The Court
denied Mississippi’s motion for leave to file the complaint without prejudice. Mississippi, 130 S. Ct.
at 1317 (citing Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 187 n.13 (1982)). The Court in Colorado
said: “Our cases establish that a State seeking to prevent or enjoin a diversion by another State bears
the burden of proving that the diversion will cause it ‘real or substantial injury or damage.’” 459
U.S. at 187 n.13 (citations omitted).
28

29

Mississippi, 506 U.S. at 77.

30

425 U.S. 794 (1976) (per curiam).

31

Id. at 794–97.

32

Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 743 (1981).

Id. at 739–44 (finding alternative forum inadequate despite involvement of state officials
in pending FERC action raising same question).
33

34
Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint at 1–2, 10–12, 21–23,
Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56 (2003) (Orig. No. 129), available at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.
com/supreme_court/briefs/22o129/22o129.cmp.pdf.
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surrounding Maryland’s efforts to block the project appeared parochial. Various
Maryland officials said that Maryland needed to control Virginia’s water supply in
order to limit growth in Northern Virginia. Another Maryland official said that if
“Virginia and Maryland were independent states, we would be at war over this,”35
tying nicely into the “casus belli” dictum about the “model” original action case.36
New Jersey involved similar stakes. New Jersey argued that Delaware was using
its coastal zone laws to effectively prohibit industrial development on the New
Jersey side of the River within the Twelve-Mile Circle.37 As Justice Scalia would
later note in dissent, the project that Delaware blocked would have “created more
than 1,300 new jobs, added $277 million to New Jersey’s gross state product,
produced $13 million in state and local tax revenues,” and increased by 15% the
region’s natural gas supply.38
An arguably-adequate alternative forum posed an obstacle in both cases,
however. In Virginia, Fairfax Water, a political subdivision of Virginia, was
embroiled in administrative litigation in Maryland seeking a permit to construct
the offshore intake. Although Fairfax Water pressed for the issuance of the permit,
it also argued that the Compact barred Maryland from requiring a permit. By the
time Virginia filed its papers in the Supreme Court, Fairfax Water had prevailed
before the administrative law judge only to have the Maryland Department of
Environment reject the decision, claiming that Virginia did not “need” a new water
intake. The Maryland administrative law judge declined to address Fairfax Water’s
Compact arguments. Moreover, Maryland’s highest court had already determined
that the Compact of 1785 did not apply in the non-tidal portion of the Potomac
River,39 where the intake was to be constructed. Accordingly, Virginia was able
to make an effective case that the alternative forum was inadequate because the
compact claim was doomed in a Maryland tribunal.
The potential alternative forum in New Jersey was also a state permit
proceeding. BP America’s affiliate was seeking a Delaware coastal zone permit to
construct the pier for the LNG facility. The Delaware agency denied the permit
a few months before New Jersey initiated litigation in the Supreme Court. BP
could have appealed the permit-denial to a state court in Delaware but chose not

35

Virginia’s Reply Brief at 3, Virginia, 540 U.S. 56 (Orig. No. 129) (on file with author).

36

Texas, 462 U.S. at 571 n.18.

New Jersey’s Brief in Support of Motion to Reopen at 19, New Jersey v. Delaware, Orig.
No. 134, 2005 WL 5949401 (Aug. 1, 2005).
37

38

New Jersey v. Delaware, 552 U.S. 597, 644 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

39

Middlekauff v. LeCompte, 132 A. 48 (Md. 1926).
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to, concluding that an appeal would be futile under Delaware law. By the time
New Jersey filed its moving papers, there was simply no alternative forum pending
in which the compact issue could have been resolved.40
Practitioners must give careful consideration to the posture of the dispute
before seeking leave to file the complaint. In Virginia, the Commonwealth
effectively positioned the case to maximize the likelihood of the Court taking
it while Maryland repeatedly blundered by exacerbating the controversy. The
Attorneys General exchanged correspondence in the months leading up to the
filing in which Maryland hardened its position that it could regulate Virginia’s
access to the Potomac River and that the Compact of 1785 did not apply. A
similar exchange of correspondence between high-level officials in New Jersey
helped crystallize the dispute there. And while Virginia’s motion for leave to file
was pending, the Maryland General Assembly took up and enacted legislation
that further regulated Virginia’s rights by requiring any water intakes to have
permanent flow-restrictors. One of the law’s proponents was quoted as saying
that the legislation would help Maryland retain control over Virginia’s water
withdrawals despite Virginia’s pending lawsuit.41 Virginia was able to bring those
statements to the Court’s attention during the briefing process.
Timing was also important. When Virginia filed suit, it appeared likely that
Fairfax Water would lose its permit-fight. Ironically, the Maryland legal process
ultimately shook loose the permit, but that was after the Supreme Court had
already taken the case and appointed a special master. Maryland’s argument
for stopping the original action would have been stronger had Maryland
issued the permit before Virginia filed suit, and if Maryland had not insisted
on new restrictions, while the gate-keeping motion was pending, that further
demonstrated Maryland’s interference with Virginia’s river-access.42

Importance of Success Before the Special Master
The Court typically appoints a special master in original action cases to take
evidence and make recommendations. The parties may file exceptions to the
special master’s report. As a practical matter, this converts what is formally a trial
court proceeding into something more closely resembling an appeal.

40
Accord Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 452 (1992) (“[N]o pending action exists to
which we could defer adjudication on this issue.”).
41

Virginia’s Reply Brief, supra note 35, at 2–3.

Maryland asked the Special Master to dismiss the case as moot after Maryland issued the
permit. But Virginia countered that the permit changed nothing; Virginians should not have had
to apply to Maryland for permits in the first place, and Maryland’s permit required a flow-restrictor
that interfered with Virginia’s compact rights. The Special Master rejected Maryland’s mootness
argument, and the final decree enjoined Maryland from enforcing the permit. Virginia v. Maryland,
540 U.S. 56, 79–80 (2003).
42
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Is the special master’s recommendation entitled to any deference? The formal
answer is no. Just as with a district court appointment, a special master’s findings
of fact and conclusions of law are both subject to de novo review.43 Chief Justice
Roberts remarked that he regards a special master “as more akin to a law clerk
than a district judge. We don’t defer to somebody who’s an aide that we have
assigned to help us gather things here.”44 Justice Scalia put it more colorfully,
and derogatorily, when he pressed Kansas’s Attorney General: “Why do you keep
talking about the Special Master? He’s just—he’s just our amanuensis. Ultimately
it’s our discretion, isn’t it?”45
But these comments understate the practical importance of a special master’s
recommendations. The record in an original action proceeding is typically huge
and the proceedings often span many years. A special master in such a case
develops an expertise in the merits that no Justice has the time to replicate.
Lengthy and complex proceedings can also give a special master the opportunity
to make numerous, effectively unreviewable, decisions. Then-Justice Rehnquist
came close to recognizing the practical deference given to a special master when
he referred to the “appellate-type review which this Court necessarily gives to his
findings and recommendations.”46
In other words, original action proceedings create two opportunities for de
facto deference to the special master. First, a state that loses an argument before
the special master may be forced to abandon it when choosing the best issues to
raise on exceptions. The 15,000-word limit (about fifty pages) that applies to
formal exceptions,47 together with appellate strategy that requires litigants to pick
their best arguments, necessarily force litigants to drop their weaker claims by the
time they file exceptions to the special master’s report.
That happened in Virginia. The parties spent the first year litigating
whether the Compact of 1785 applied to the entire Potomac River or only the
tidal portion. The Special Master ruled in Virginia’s favor on this “Entire River”

43
Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(f )(3)–(4) (providing for “de novo” review of special master’s findings
of fact and conclusions of law); Eugene Gressman et al., Supreme Court Practice 643 (9th ed.
2007) (“[T]he Master’s reports and recommendations are advisory only . . . .”).
44
Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854
(2010) (Orig. No. 138), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_
transcripts/138-orig.pdf.

Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Kansas v. Colorado, 556 U.S. 98 (2009) (Orig. No.
105) (emphasis added), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_
transcripts/105%20Orig.pdf. An amanuensis is “a literary or artistic assistant, in particular one who
takes dictation or copies manuscripts.” The Oxford American College Dictionary 36 (2002).
45

46

Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 765 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

47

Sup. Ct. R. 33.1(g).
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issue.48 Although the Special Master could have submitted an interim report to
the Court, he did not. If he had, Maryland certainly would have filed exceptions
and would have had a chance to win the argument there. Instead, the parties
spent the next eighteen months of the litigation addressing Maryland’s argument
that the Compact preserved its inherent police power over Virginia’s shoreline,
and that Virginia’s Compact rights were abandoned through prescription
and acquiescence. Special Master Lancaster ultimately resolved those issues in
Virginia’s favor, too. While Maryland filed exceptions to those recommendations,
it chose not to contest his earlier ruling on the Entire River issue.49 That ruling
was then embodied in the final decree,50 which effectively overruled a decision of
Maryland’s highest court in 1926 51—all without any formal analysis of the issue
by the Supreme Court.52
Second, the Court may implicitly defer to the recommendations of special
masters because of the greater time they spend with the massive record and their
expertise in the subject matter. Justice Ginsburg suggested such deference in
her opinion for the majority in New Jersey, noting that Lancaster had “carefully
considered nearly 6,500 pages of materials presented by the parties in support of
cross-motions for summary judgment.” 53
Moreover, Lancaster may have received greater deference by the majority
in New Jersey because he was also the Special Master in Virginia, and Lancaster
himself distinguished the two cases. Justice Ginsburg intimated some deference to
him when she wrote that “both original actions were referred to Ralph I. Lancaster,
Jr., as Special Master. We find persuasive the Special Master’s reconciliation
of his recommendations in the two actions.”54 Indeed, although Justice Scalia

48
Report of the Special Master at 15–44, 54, 58-65, Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56 (2003)
(Orig. No. 129), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/SpecMastRpt/Orig129_120602.pdf.
49
Justice Stevens remarked at oral argument that he “made the mistake of reading the
Master’s report before I read the briefs,” asking Maryland to confirm that it was “no longer” arguing
the Entire River issue. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Virginia, 540 U.S. 56 (Orig. No. 129),
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/129orig.pdf.
50

Virginia, 540 U.S. at 79.

51

Middlekauff v. LeCompte, 132 A. 48, 48 (Md. 1926).

There is no guarantee that the Court will adopt a special master’s recommendation simply
because the losing party chooses not to challenge it. Indeed, the Court declined to approve the
parties’ consent decree in Vermont v. New York. 417 U.S. 270 (1974). The decree would have
required the Court to appoint a special “lake master” who could make arbitral decisions that would
then be reviewable by the Court. Id. at 277. The Court refused to approve the decree, suggesting
instead that the parties resolve the dispute through an interstate compact or binding settlement
agreement. Id. at 278. But arguments that the parties choose not to pursue are typically considered
abandoned. Alabama v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295, 2307 (2010) (treating as abandoned an
exception that was not briefed).
52

53

New Jersey v. Delaware, 552 U.S. 597, 608 (2008).

54

Id. at 617 (emphasis added).
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maintained that Virginia “effectively decided” New Jersey,55 Delaware’s position
was strengthened considerably because the Special Master thought the cases
were distinguishable.
In short, although a case is not necessarily over when a state loses the special
master’s recommendation, the state filing exceptions will have a more challenging
hurdle to overcome than might be suggested by the de novo standard of review.

Original Actions Are Sui Generis
As noted above, the language in the New Jersey and Delaware Compact of
1905 appeared to give New Jersey a stronger claim to exclusive jurisdiction over
its side of the Delaware River than Virginia had on its side of the Potomac River
under the Virginia and Maryland Compact of 1785. Yet the Special Master and
the majority in New Jersey concluded that the language of New Jersey’s compact
was weaker. Lancaster addressed Virginia’s precedential effect in a footnote in
his report in New Jersey; he said the result in Virginia “[s]uperficially . . . would
appear to support New Jersey’s argument here,” but he distinguished Virginia
based on “the unique language of the compact and arbitration award involved in
that case.”56 Justice Scalia, in a dissent joined by Justice Alito, strongly criticized
the “unique language” argument as one that undermines the value of precedent:
Our opinion in Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56 (2003),
effectively decided this case. It rejected the very same assertion
of a riverbed-owning State’s supervening police-power authority
over constructions into the river from a State that had been
conceded riparian rights.
...
Today’s opinion, quoting the Special Master, claims that the
result in Virginia v. Maryland turned on “‘the unique language of
the compact and arbitration award involved in that case.’” But
the case did not say that. And of course virtually every written
agreement or award has “unique language,” so if we could only
extend to other cases legal principles pertaining to identical
language our interpretive jurisprudence would be limited indeed.57

55

Id. at 638 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Id. at 617 (quoting Report of the Special Master at 64 n.118, New Jersey v. Delaware, 552
U.S. 597 (2008), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/SpecMastRpt/Orig134_041697.pdf ).
56

57

Id. at 638–39 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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Justice Scalia also criticized the majority in New Jersey for inventing the
distinction between “ordinary and usual riparian rights” and wharves of
“extraordinary character” 58—a distinction none of the parties or the Special
Master ever suggested. He accused the majority of making up that distinction
because the case involved a pier for offloading potentially hazardous substances,
rather than a less-menacing use, like offloading vegetables (or like the water intake
structure at issue in Virginia):
The Court inexplicably concludes, however, that the liquefied
natural gas (LNG) unloading wharf at stake in this litigation
“goes well beyond the ordinary or usual.” Why? Because it
possesses “extraordinary character.”
To our knowledge (and apparently to the Court’s, judging
by its failure to cite any authority) the phrase has never been
mentioned before in any case involving limitations on wharfing
out. What in the world does it mean? Would a pink wharf, or a
zig-zagged wharf qualify? Today’s opinion itself gives the phrase
no content . . . . This rationale is bizarre.59
...
Could the determinative fact be that the wharf will be used
to transport liquefied natural gas, which is dangerous? No again.
The Court cites no support, and I am aware of none, for the
proposition that the common law forbade a wharf owner to load
or unload hazardous goods. . . .
. . . I am not so rash as to suggest, however, that these factors
had nothing to do with the Court’s decision. After all, our
environmentally sensitive Court concedes that if New Jersey had
approved a wharf of equivalent dimensions, to accommodate
tankers of equivalent size, carrying tofu and bean sprouts,
Delaware could not have interfered.60
Whether Justice Scalia was right to criticize the majority in New Jersey for
deciding the case based on concerns over the LNG facility, rather than applying
the reasoning of Virginia, this episode offers an important lesson to advocates in
original action cases: never underestimate the potential to distinguish unfavorable

58

Id. at 628.

59

Id. at 640.

60

Id. at 643–44 (citations omitted).
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precedent based on the “unique” facts of the earlier case. The Court may be
receptive to arguments that original actions are sui generis, and decisions from one
case may not control the outcome in another.

Conclusion
Suits between states on the Supreme Court’s original docket provide a
wonderful opportunity for creative lawyering at all stages of the process. States
seeking to persuade the Court to exercise jurisdiction can improve their chances
by taking careful steps before filing their papers to show that the case is a serious
one, warranting the Court’s intervention, and to demonstrate that no alternative
forum exists in which the issue can be resolved. Conversely, the state that sees
one of these actions coming can take defensive steps to improve its chances of
persuading the Court to decline jurisdiction, such as by offering its adversary
avenues to avoid litigation through negotiation, and by avoiding being locked
into a legal position prematurely that may come back to haunt it. If the Court
accepts jurisdiction, success before the special master is extremely important,
if not critical. And original actions, perhaps more so than cases on the Court’s
appellate docket, permit effective advocates to distinguish precedent that might
otherwise appear controlling.
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